1. **Thug.** Adam has $24 to spend on beer at the pub (and he'll spend whatever he has once he gets to the pub). His utility function is $u(b) = b^{1/3}$. The price of beer is $p_b = 3$, and one can buy fractional amounts of beer. There is a 50% chance that Adam will get mugged on the way to the pub and have his money stolen, in which case he consumes 0 beer. (There is no other utility loss from being mugged other than no beer.) (This problem adapted from Serrano and Feldman 2013.)

   (a) What is Adam's expected beer consumption? What is his expected utility?

   (b) Draw a graph of (a) including Adam's utility function.

   (c) The neighborhood thug is offering protection from mugging for $6 (which will come out of Adam's beer money). Will he pay for protection?

2. **AishaMrLee.** Aisha's utility function is
   
   $$u(G, V) = G^{0.7} V^{0.3}$$
   
   and Mr. Lee's utility function is
   
   $$u(G, V) = G^{0.9} V^{0.1}$$

   Aisha has 20 ounces of $G$ and 10 ounces of $V$. Mr. Lee has 15 ounces of $G$ and 15 ounces of $V$. This is all the $G$ and $V$ there is in the world, and there are no other people to trade with.
(a) Calculate the MRS in \((G, V)\) space for both consumers at the endowment point.

(b) Draw an Edgeworth box showing the endowment and indifference curves of the consumers. (The indifference curves do not have to be plotted to match the utility function perfectly.)

(c) Assume that Aisha and Mr. Lee can trade at a market price as price-takers. If we set \(G\) as the numeraire, what is the price of \(V\)? What is the final allocation of \(G\) and \(V\)?

(d) Show the trading in your diagram.

3. **Pate.** There are two goods, beef (B) and goose liver pate (G). The typical French person has an endowment of \(\omega_B = 50, \omega_G = 50\) and a utility function \(U(B, G) = B^{0.3}G^{0.7}\). The typical American has an endowment of \(\omega_B = 70, \omega_G = 30\) and a utility function \(U(B, G) = B^{0.8}\). Note that the typical American simply does not receive utility from the pate.

   (a) What is the typical French and American MRS in \((B,G)\) space at the endowment points?

   (b) Draw an Edgeworth box and show indifference curves for each type of consumer. Show the core and the contract curve.

4. **CokePepsi.** The income elasticity demand for Coke is \(\epsilon^c_m = 0.58\). For Pepsi, the income elasticity is \(\epsilon^p_m = 1.38\) at the current equilibrium points

   (a) Which apply to Coke and Pepsi: normal, inferior, luxury, necessity? Why?

   (b) Suppose in equilibrium, a person buys 1 bottle of each drink. Draw the Engel Curves for Coke and Pepsi. Which Engel curve is steeper?
(c) Suppose we calculated a cross-price elasticity of Coke for Pepsi:

\[ \epsilon_{cp} = \frac{\partial q_{coke}}{\partial p_{pepsi}} \frac{p_{pepsi}}{q_{coke}} \]

What sign do you expect? Why?

(d) Suppose the demand function for Coke is \( q_{coke}(p_{coke}, p_{pepsi}, m) \).
Write the total differential of this function.

Review Problems, not to turn in:

5. *Sopranos*. There are two goods, numeraire \( x \) and cooking \( c \). The price of numeraire is always 1 throughout this problem, and the price of cooking is \( p_c \).

Mrs. Soprano and Mrs. Bucco both have the same utility function:

\[ u(x, c) = x^{0.8} c^{0.2} \]

Mrs. Soprano’s endowment is \((\omega_{sx}, \omega_{sc}) = (100, 10)\). Mrs. Bucco’s endowment is \((\omega_{bx}, \omega_{bc}) = (10, 10)\).

With this utility function and these endowments, the demand functions for numeraire for Mrs. Soprano and Mrs. Bucco are

\[ x_s = 0.8 \frac{100 + 10p_c}{1} \quad x_B = 0.8 \frac{10 + 10p_c}{1} \]

(a) If the two women can trade in an Edgeworth Box, what will be the final allocation and what will be the price of cooking?

(b) Suppose that the "powers than be" decide that this final allocation is not all right. They want the final allocation to be \((x_B, c_B) = (66, 12)\). Note that (66,12) IS on the contract curve. What lump sum taxes and subsidies on the numeraire are necessary to make this happen? Illustrate with an Edgeworth Box diagram.
6. **Pareto.** Is it possible to have a Pareto efficient allocation where someone is worse off than he is at an allocation that is not Pareto efficient? Illustrate with an Edgeworth Box.

7. **RichAndPoor.** A very rich person and a very poor person are going to trade in an Edgeworth box. The rich person is named Ms. 1 and her origin is the lower left corner. The poor person is named Mr. 2 and his origin is the upper right hand corner. The two people will trade good $y$ (on the vertical axis) and good $x$ (on the horizontal axis). Ms. 1 has the entire endowment of good $x$, and there is a lot of that good. Mr. 2 has the entire endowment of good $y$, but there is not that much of it. Both people's indifference curves indicate that good $y$ doesn't bring very much utility compared to good $x$.

   (a) Draw the Edgeworth box, showing the endowment point, indifference curves, and the contract curve. What is the Walrasian equilibrium? Is it efficient?

   (b) Suppose the government values equality and wants the final outcome of trading to be the allocation approximately in the center of the box. Show a government price control that forces the center point to be in the budget sets of both consumers. How does this change the Walrasian equilibrium? Is “equality” achieved? Is this solution efficient.

   (c) Can the government use the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics to improve on part (b)?
5. Sopranos_a.

(a) There are 110 units of numeraire in the economy, so we need

\[ x_S + x_B = 0.8 \frac{100 + 10p_c}{1} + 0.8 \frac{10 + 10p_c}{1} = 110 \]

Solving this gives \( p_c = 1.375 \).

This means that \( x_S = 91, \ x_B = 19, \ c_S = 16.55, \ c_B = 3.45 \). That is, Mrs. Bucco sells some cooking to Mrs. Soprano in exchange for numeraire.

(b) Because of Walras’ Law, all we need is to consider the demands for \( x \). Note that if we take some amount of numeraire \( t \) from Mrs. Soprano and give it to Mrs. Bucco, the two women’s demand curves become

\[ x_S = 0.8 \frac{100 - t + 10p_c}{1} \]
\[ x_B = 0.8 \frac{10 + t + 10p_c}{1} \]

When we add these up and set equal to 110, the lump-sum transfer \( t \) just cancels out, so the price of cooking is still \( p_c = 1.375 \). Then all we have to do is make sure that Mrs. Bucco consumes \( x_B = 66 \) in the final allocation, and we’re done. Thus:

\[ x_B = 0.8 \frac{10 + t + 10 \cdot 1.375}{1} = 66 \]
\[ 19 + 0.8t = 66 \]
\[ t = 58.75 \]

To confirm this all works, consider that Mrs. Soprano must therefore consume the following amount of cooking:

\[ c_S = 0.2 \frac{100 - 58.75 + 10 \cdot 1.375}{1.375} = 8 \]
Since there are 20 units of cooking total and the goal was to have Mrs. Bucco consume 12 of them, Mrs. Soprano should consume 8, so this checks out. Note that the tax scheme reverses the trading: now Mrs. Soprano cooks for Mrs. Bucco!

6. *Pareto_a*. Yes, Pareto efficiency says that it is not possible to make one person better off without making another person worse off. But that does not preclude making one person better off and making the other worse off. For example, in the graph Vilfredo is better off at point $B$ than point $A$, even though $B$ is not on the contract curve and not Pareto-efficient while $A$ is.

(a) To show the relatively low value both people put on good $y$, we need a large MRS (steeply sloped indifference curves).

(b) Although the center point would then be feasible from the point of view of the budget line, it would not be a Walrasian equilibrium. The indifference curves of the two consumers would be tangent at two different points along this budget line, so there would not be a market-clearing equilibrium. Some gains from trade would be lost, and the center point would not actually be achieved. In any case, unless the center point lies exactly on the contract curve, it is not efficient, since the consumers can Pareto-improve on it.

(c) The second welfare theorem says that any point on the contract curve can be supported as a Walrasian equilibrium provided the consumers begin at the proper endowment point. In the graph, the government could lump-sum-redistribute good $x$ from Ms. 1 to Mr. 2. Then the agents can trade at free-market prices and come as close to the center of the box as the contract curve will allow.